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Abstract  
 
Our study examines home drivers of China’s regional outward FDI. We propose a theoretical 
framework that incorporates an extended Investment Development Path (IDP) theory, home 
locational constraints, policy incentives and geographic factors. Empirically, we employ the 
Bayesian Averaging Maximum Likelihood Estimates method to address model uncertainty. 
All proposed theories (except for geographic aspects) are found to provide important per-
spectives explaining China’s regional outward FDI. Our results highlight the importance of 
government policies but do not support the original IDP hypothesis that outward investment 
is automatically generated as income grows. Our findings have implications for both regional 
and central-government policy.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Since the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has been at-
tracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from the rest of the world and has become one of 
the world’s major FDI destinations. In the past two decades, however, a new trend has 
emerged: a dramatic increase in China’s outward FDI (OFDI), especially since the introduc-
tion in 1999 of a national policy of encouraging domestic investment to “go out” of China 
(see Table 1). In 2011, China was the world’s 6th largest source of FDI. Along with the 
impressive growth of overseas investment, a fair amount of literature has emerged explain-
ing the determinants of China’s OFDI at country (e.g. Liu et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & Qian, 2009; Wei & Alon, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Kolstad & 
Wigg, 2012), industry- (e.g. Amighini et al., 2011) and firm level (e.g. Amighini et al., 2012; 
Wang et al., 2012). A summary of these studies is presented in Table 2.  
Compared with previous analyses, our study attempts to investigate drivers of 
China’s overseas investment from a fresh angle – China’s regional OFDI. According to the 
Ministry of Commerce of China (MoCC), there are two groups of outward investors in 
China. The first group includes large central firms which are directly supervised and man-
aged by the State Council, while the second group includes regional firms that are owned by 
regional governments and the private sector. Although started off with little investment, in 
the past decade, regional OFDI investors have grown into significant players in China’s 
overseas market. For instance, in 2011, about half of the top 100 Chinese firms ranked by 
OFDI stock were regional firms1. More importantly, in terms of size, during 2003–2011, 
nearly a quarter of China’s OFDI has been regional investment, with central investment 
making up the rest (see Table 1). Given the increasing importance of OFDI at regional level, 
it is surprising to find that no previous studies have attempted to specifically identify the 
drivers of China’s regional OFDI.   
In addition to the growing volume, what makes the issue of China’s regional OFDI 
interesting is the enormous heterogeneity amongst the Chinese regions (see Figure 1 for a 
1 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China provides the 
names of centrally owned firms. The MoCC provides the top 100 Chinese firms ranked by OFDI Stock. By 
cross checking, we find that in 2011, of the top 100 firms, around 50 were regionally and 50 centrally owned 
firms. Regional firms include Huawei, Geely, Haier and TCL, which have made the headlines in international 
media for their overseas expansions.  
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map of China)2. The heterogeneity is not only reflected in the levels of income (measured 
by gross regional product per capita for instance), but also in many other aspects of the eco-
nomic development, such as the scale of the international trade, cost of labour, level of edu-
cational attainment, etc3. Geographic heterogeneity is also noticeable across Chinese re-
gions. For instance, some are located in the eastern coastal area while others are located in 
the interior. In the past decade, there there have also been significant dynamics related to 
regional OFDI. Based on data provided by MoCC, over the years, we observe a more bal-
anced distribution of OFDI among regions, although the eastern regions still constitute the 
leading OFDI source. Such dynamics and heterogeneity across Chinese regions would have 
been disguised in a country-level analysis.   
Furthermore, a regional analysis can provide policy implications at both central and 
local levels. An important characteristic of regional investors distinguishing them from cen-
tral investors is that they are affected not only by national policies, but also by regional ones. 
This is particularly true for China since regional governments need to comply with central 
policies but also need to adjust to local situations, in order to ensure strong regional economic 
growth. Hence both regional and central policies should be investigated to understand re-
gional investors’ decisions, and doing so should provide valuable information for both cen-
tral and local governments to design strategies for facilitating China’s overall international 
expansion. 
Thus, given its growing importance, the heterogeneity across Chinese regions, and 
the possibly important policy implications here for both central and local governments, a 
study dedicated specifically to China’s regional OFDI is warranted. 
As the first study to examine the determinants of China’s OFDI at regional level, 
our study further contributes to the literature in the following three important ways. First, 
although many previous analyses investigate China’s OFDI from a host-country perspective, 
only a handful of studies explore the role of home-country factors at national level (e.g. Liu 
et al., 2005; Wei & Alon, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Buckley et al., 20074). However, it is the 
home-country factors that decision makers can directly influence. The first three studies 
2 Figure 1 shows that there are 31 regions in China, which include twenty 2 provinces, 5 Autonomous Regions 
and 4 Municipalities. For simplicity, we also refer to all of these as Chinese regions in the rest of the paper.  
3 For instance, in 2011, international trade (exports plus imports) of Guangdong province alone reached 1006.8 
billion US Dollar (USD), exceeding a quarter of China’s total international trade that year, while that of Qinghai 
province was merely 0.8 billion USD. 
4 At firm level, a recent study Wang et al. (2012) also explores driving factors of Chinese firms’ OFDI. 
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mentioned above focus mainly on macroeconomic factors, but their results may provide lim-
ited implications due to the constraint of short time series data (a maximum of 25 observa-
tions based on limited data availability). Buckley et al. (2007) include one home-country 
policy variable (policy liberalisation measured by a dummy variable), and two home country 
macroeconomic variables (exports and imports). To circumvent the issues of limited number 
of observations and to offer directly employable information to both regional and central 
policy makers, our study employs panel regional level data and focuses on home-country 
factors.  
Second, previous studies on China’s OFDI are largely focused on a single theoret-
ical perspective (see Table 2). In her extensive review of theoretical FDI models, Faeth 
(2009) finds that different theories do not necessarily replace each other but may explain 
different aspects of the same phenomenon; hence she suggests that FDI should not be ex-
plained by single theories but more broadly by a combination of them. Buckley et al. (2007) 
and Wang et al. (2012) have already done so for China (see Table 2). In our study, we pro-
pose a comprehensive multi-level theoretical framework to investigate home drivers of 
China’s regional OFDI. It builds on four different, but complementary, theoretical explana-
tions, namely the extended Investment Development Path (IDP) theory, home locational 
constraints, policy incentives, and geographic factors.  
Third, the growth of both theoretical and empirical literature on FDI in recent dec-
ades has led to a wide list of variables being proposed as FDI determinants, and often differ-
ent FDI theories are compatible with one another5. Naturally, the issue of model uncertainty 
arises, as theory may not provide enough guidance to select the proper empirical model. This 
issue is particularly relevant to our study since we investigate four alternative theoretical 
explanations of the same OFDI phenomenon. Conventional regression and cointegration 
techniques employed in previous studies on China (see Table 2) are not able to solve this 
issue. Our study employs the recently developed panel Bayesian Averaging of Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates (BAMLE) by Moral-Benito (2012) to deal with model uncertainty. We 
employ this novel technique not only because it is specifically designed for panel data, but 
5 For instance, Assunção et al. (2011) review recent literature on location determinants of FDI. Following their 
categorisation, FDI determinates associated with the location, such as infrastructure and human capital, is not 
logically inconsistent with ones associated with the new theory of trade, such as openness of the economy and 
factor endowments in natural resources, or ones associated with the institutional approach, such as corruption 
and or corporate taxation. 
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also because of the unique nature of its likelihood function. To our knowledge, it is the first 
time this method has been used in any FDI literature.  
 
 
2 Theoretical foundations 
 
Studies that empirically examine the determinants of China’s OFDI have employed various 
theoretical models (see Table 2). These models include Dunning’s (1981) Investment De-
velopment Path (IDP) theory (e.g., Liu et al., 2005; Wei & Alon, 2010), general multina-
tional firm theory, namely market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset- seeking mo-
tives (e.g., Amighini et al., 2011, 2012; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & 
Qian, 2009), and factor analysis where macroeconomic variables are introduced based on 
reviews of important determinants analysed in the previous literature (e.g., Kolstad & Wigg, 
2012; Tolentino, 2010). Two studies have combined several alternative theoretical models. 
Using firm-level data, Wang et al. (2012) combine institutional theory, industrial organisa-
tion economy, and a resource-based view of firms to explain China’s OFDI. Using national 
aggregate data, Buckley et al. (2007) nest three special explanations (capital market imper-
fections, special ownership advantages and institutional factors) within the general theory of 
the multinational firm.  
After reviewing a range of theoretical FDI models, Faeth (2009) concludes that dif-
ferent theories do not necessarily replace each other but may instead explain different aspects 
of the same phenomenon, and hence that FDI should not be explained by single theories but 
more broadly a combination of them. Buckley et al. (2007) and Wang et al. (2012) have done 
so for China’s OFDI at country- and firm-level, respectively. For our regional analysis, we 
propose a comprehensive theoretical framework that combines four complementary theoret-
ical explanations, namely the extended IDP theory, home locational constraints, policy in-
centives, and geographic factors.  
 
 
2.1 Extended investment development path theory 
 
Dunning’s (1981) Investment Development Path (IDP) theory has provided a longstanding 
explanation of the OFDI from many countries. In essence, the IDP theory postulates that a 
country’s investment development cycle is dependent on a country’s level of economic de-
velopment. As one country develops through each stage, OFDI is initially at near zero (first 
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stage), starts to emerge (second stage), increases (third stage), surpasses inward FDI (fourth 
stage) and finally is neutralised by inward FDI (fifth stage). The basic hypothesis of IDP 
theory is that as a country develops, the localisation advantages of the host country and the 
ownership advantages of home-country multinational firms undergo change as host coun-
tries themselves develop so as to provide ownership advantages and thus begin to generate 
OFDI and in turn seek localisation advantages elsewhere in overseas countries6. Therefore, 
the IDP theory seems to be particularly relevant to China during its fast economic develop-
ment and its emergence from a FDI destination to one of world’s major FDI sources. 
However, despite having successfully explained OFDI from many developed coun-
tries, the IDP theory has raised questions when it has been applied to developing and transi-
tional economies. For instance, Svetličič (2003) suggest that “leapfrogging globals” in tran-
sitional economies may skip some of the stages described in the IDP theory. Kuada and 
Sorensen (2000) and Erdilek (2003) find that some developing countries are unable to carry 
out international activities, or they fail to develop localisation advantages despite moving 
through the economic development stages.  
Thus, our study investigates whether for China, the world’s largest developing 
economy, OFDI is consistent with the IDP theory or does it represent a major exception to 
it, especially given China’s unique economic development path and the role played by its 
governments in the market-oriented economy. In particular, we consider whether China’s 
economic development is captured solely by its GDP per capita, as suggested by the original 
IDP theory, or by a range of factors that reflect other aspects of the development of the 
Chinese economy.    
 
 
2.2 Home locational constraints 
 
Economic reforms and liberalisation – common features of developing and transitional econ-
omies – often lead to surges of OFDI as domestic firms, for the first time, are allowed to 
6 The concepts of location and ownership advantage are derived from Dunning’s “OLI” (or “eclectic”) ap-
proach to the study of FDI (See, for example, Dunning (1977)), where multinational firms’ decisions on in-
vesting abroad are explained by ownership (O) advantage, if these firms possess superior technological 
knowledge or management skills (developed in home markets), localisation (L) advantage, if the host markets 
have non-transferable characteristics such as cheaper labour and abundant natural resources, or internalisation 
(I) advantage, if these firms consider it to be in their interest to exploit imperfections in external markets. 
 9 
                                                 
Kefei You What drives China’s outward FDI?  
A regional analysis 
 
 
escape rigid home market constraints and to invest abroad. In the presence of this phenom-
enon, referred to as ‘leapfrogging’ (Svetličič, 2003), OFDI from developing and transitional 
economies is not driven by ownership advantages associated with economic development 
but instead by home localisation disadvantages (Svetličič, 2003).  
According to UNCTAD (2006), home locational conditions, which tend to induce 
companies to move abroad, consist mainly of the following types: market and trade condi-
tions, costs of production, and local business conditions7. For developing and transitional 
economies, these conditions often entail home-localisation disadvantages for domestic 
firms. For instance, corresponding to the three types of home locational conditions, in de-
veloping countries, typically there are limited home markets in terms of scale and opportu-
nities to expand, increasing production costs due to rapid economic expansion, or a scarcity 
of resources or inputs such as labour, and competition pressure from local or foreign firms 
within the home market. Empirical studies have also confirmed these three common home 
locational constraints as pushing factors that lead developing-country firms to go overseas. 
Some examples include UNCTAD (2003) for the limited size of domestic markets; Brooks 
& Mirza (2005) for the rising costs of home production; Farrell et al. (2005) for intense 
competition from both local and foreign firms. However, despite their relevance for devel-
oping economies, home locational constraints have not been empirically examined as re-
gards OFDI from China. Therefore, in our study, we include home locational constraints as 
an important theoretical explanation of China’s regional OFDI.   
 
 
2.3 Policy incentives 
 
In a recent literature review by Faeth (2009), policy incentives were found to form an im-
portant category of theoretical models that explain firms’ overseas investment decisions8. 
Specifically, governments can influence the firm’s choice between domestic production, li-
censing or FDI, the firm’s location choice, the firm’s choice to stay or expand, etc. Indeed, 
7 UNCTAD (2006) also includes government policies as part of home country conditions. For China, govern-
ment polices are not necessary form constraints on OFDI, especially since the “Going Out” policy in 1999. We 
discuss government policies separately in the following section. 
8 Faeth (2009) provides a broad categorisation of existing FDI models. They include the neoclassical model, 
which explains international capital trade by differences in returns on capital, Dunning’s (1977, 1979) OLI 
framework, which combines Ownership, Location and Internalisation as determinants of FDI after they were 
previously discussed in separate theories, new trade theory, which combines ownership and location with tech-
nology and country characteristics and explain both horizontal and vertical FDI, risk diversification hypothesis, 
and policy incentives.  
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government policies such as tax rates have been examined in a number of studies and are 
shown to have significant influence on FDI (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2001a, b; Hubert & 
Pain, 2002).  
Developing economies often feature significant government involvement in busi-
ness affairs despite the emergence of a market system. For instance, Le & Zak (2006) find 
that policy uncertainty is an important driver of capital outflows from developing countries. 
Correspondingly, home government policy is regarded as an essential part of an action plan 
for investment in less developed countries proposed by UNCTAD (2011). In terms of China, 
apart from the dominant central government, regional governments are gaining more auton-
omy in the process of reform and liberalisation. They need to comply with central guideline 
policies but are also keen to extend their local influence in order to promote rapid economic 
growth in their own regions. Therefore, we expect both central and local governments to 
have a profound impact on Chinese regional OFDI.   
It is worth mentioning that many studies have analysed the role of host government 
policies in the host country in determining the location of FDI (see Assunção et al. (2011) 
and Faeth (2009) for reviews of recent literature in this strand), yet the impact of home policy 
factors on OFDI has not been extensively studied9. For China, only a few policy variables 
(e.g., liberalisation policy in 1992 in Buckley et al. (2007), interest rate policy and exchange 
rate policy in Wei & Alon (2010) and Tolentino (2010), government support in certain in-
dustries in Wang et al. (2011)) have been employed in previous analyses as home determi-
nants of China’s OFDI. In our study, we not only examine a wide range of central polices, 
but also introduce important local government policies, to form a third explanation for 
China’s regional OFDI.  
 
 
2.4 Geographic factors 
 
Gallup et al. (1999) emphasise that geography continues to play an important role in eco-
nomic development, alongside economic and political institutions. Geographic features of 
host countries (e.g., landlocked or island economy) have been widely employed to explain 
locational decisions for FDI. In the case of China, it is widely recognised that there is geo-
graphic heterogeneity amongst the regions. For instance, some regions are located in the 
9 E.g., Tallman (1988), Schoppa (2006), Durán & Ubeda (2001), Globerman & Shapiro (2002), Le & Zak 
(2006), Das (2013). Of these six studies, only the last four analyse developing countries. 
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coastal areas while others in the inland areas; some regions are richer in natural resources 
than others; etc. To explicitly account for this regional heterogeneity, we introduce geo-
graphic factors to form the final theoretical explanation of China’s regional OFDI.  
 
 
3 Hypotheses development  
 
3.1 An extended investment development path theory for Chinese regions 
 
In the original IDP theory, the level of economic development is explicitly measured by 
GDP per capita (see for instance Buckley & Castro (1998), Dunning et al. (2001) and Ka-
lotay (2004)). Many researchers have raised the point that GDP per capita alone may not be 
sufficient capture all aspects of economic development of a country, and many additional 
economic elements have been proposed (e.g., Dunning, 1986, 1988; Narula, 1996; Dunning 
& Narula, 1996; Durán & Ubeda, 2001). As summarised by Dunning & Narula (1996), each 
country is different and hence the way that FDI activity and economic development interact 
is unique to each individual country.  
For China, Liu et al. (2005) also suggest theoretical modification of the original 
IDP theory by considering other aspects of economic development in addition to the stage 
of development captured by GDP per capita. Specifically, they extend the IDP model to 
introduce investment in human capital, exports and inward FDI in addition to GDP per capita 
as home-country determinants of China’s aggregate OFDI. Also based on the IDP model, 
Wei & Alon (2010) include technology, trade openness (exports and imports) and foreign 
exchange (FX) reserves in addition to income per capita to reflect the economic development 
in China10.  
At regional level, following Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon (2010), we employ 
an extended IDP theory, i.e., incorporating five economic variables (i.e., human capital, trade 
openness, technology, inward FDI and FX reserves) in addition to Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) per capita, to reflect the ownership advantage of regional overseas investors.  
In addition to the above five economic variables, we incorporate agglomeration 
economics into the extend IDP theory.  Agglomeration effects arise from the presence of 
10 Note that Wei & Alon (2010) also introduce the interest rate and exchange rate as two determinants of 
China’s OFDI. These two variables are regarded as policy variables in our study, as they are set by the Chinese 
government rather than by the market; they are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.  
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other firms, other industries, as well as from the availability of skilled labour force (Vena-
bles, 1996). Previous OFDI from a home country can create positive externalities, such as 
factories and production lines that have already been set up, and hence it encourages further 
OFDI flows. As pointed out by Krugman (1997), FDI tends to follow previous investment. 
Cheung & Qian (2009) find overwhelming evidence of agglomeration effects for China’s 
national OFDI.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The level of China’s regional OFDI is positively related to (a) GRP 
per capita, (b) human capital, (c) inward FDI, (d) international trade, (e) FX re-
serves, (f) technology capability, (g) agglomeration effects.   
 
 
3.2 Regional locational constraints 
 
As mentioned earlier, we examine three types of locational constraints on the home econ-
omy: market and trade conditions (e.g., limited home market), costs of production (e.g., ris-
ing cost of labour), and local business conditions (e.g., competition from foreign firms). To 
our knowledge, none of these home locational constraints has been empirically examined as 
important home determinants of China’s OFDI at national or regional level.  
In terms of a limited home market, UNCTAD (2003) suggests that insufficient do-
mestic consumption, coupled with excess industrial productive capacity since the late 1990s 
in certain industries (especially in machinery and electronic appliances), have encouraged 
Chinese firms to look for overseas markets. Regarding cost of labour, in recent decades, it 
has been increasing at a fast pace11 as China has started to “catch up” with developed coun-
tries and the Chinese population has begun to age. For home business conditions, competi-
tion from foreign firms in the home economy is widely seen as an important driver behind 
China’s rapid increase in OFDI (e.g., Nolan, 2001; Jürgens & Rehbehn, 2006), especially 
given that many foreign firms in China are export oriented.  
In addition to competition from foreign enterprises, inadequate infrastructure is also 
a form of adverse business conditions at home that may push domestic investment abroad 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Following a decade of sizeable investment, the level of infrastructure of 
11 According to data from China Statistical Yearbook 2011, the average Chinese annual real (consumer price 
index adjusted) salary per person has increased from 13980 Chinese Yuan in 2003 to 38935 in 2011. 
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China is above that of most other developing countries but is still well below that of devel-
oped economies12. Similarly, pollution is another form of adverse business condition for 
Chinese firms, especially given that it has led to gradually tightening environmental regula-
tions13. As suggested by the pollution haven hypothesis (Pethig, 1976; Yohe, 1979), the pro-
duction of pollution intensive goods will migrate from countries with high environmental 
standards to ones with low standards.  
 
Hypothesis 2: the level of China’s regional OFDI is positively related to (a) cost of 
labour, (b) foreign competition, (c) pollution; and negatively related to (d) domestic 
consumption14, (e) infrastructure. 
 
 
3.3 Policy incentives of Chinese regions 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, only a few government policies have been analysed by previous 
studies as home determinants of China’s OFDI. Following Wei & Alon (2010) and Tolentino 
(2010), we include both interest rate and exchange rate as indictors of monetary and foreign 
exchange policies, respectively. Both rates are tightly administrated by the Chinese central 
government. The interest rate determines the opportunity cost of capital domestically as well 
as the profitability of investments (Grubaugh, 1987) and hence has a direct negative impact 
on OFDI. A stronger home currency encourages OFDI, as it lowers the capital requirements 
of the investment (Aliber, 1970). Since the most recent foreign exchange reform in 2005, the 
Chinese Yuan (CNY) has appreciated against the USD by over 24% (from 8.27 to 6.33 
CNY/USD in 2011), which has had a positive influence on China’s OFDI.  
In addition to the above two central polices in monetary and foreign exchange areas, 
and to better account for the role of both central and local governments, we also include five 
new central government policies: credit growth, corporate taxation, anti-corruption, work-
12 For instance, according to The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013 by the World Economic Forum, 
China’s level of infrastructure is better than India’s and Brazil’s but still ranks only 48 out of around 150 
countries.  
13 In 1989, the first Environment Protection Law was put forward in China. At firm level, in 2006, Corporate 
Social Responsibility has become a law introduced under Company Law in China. 
14 Modigliani & Cao (2004) and You & Sarantis (2012) explain the high savings ratio in China by demographic 
structure, as they find that a gradual reduction in the relative number of young (under 15), induced by the One-
Child policy, has reduced the consumption-to-income ratio. We examined the young dependence ratio instead 
of consumption, but our empirical results suggest that it was not a robust determinant of regional OFDI. 
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ers’ rights, presence of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and two regional government pol-
icies (willingness to approve regional OFDI, and investment in research and development 
(R&D)). 
Besides the interest rate, the Chinese central bank also relies heavily on direct ad-
ministrative limits on loan growth as part of their monetary policy (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011). The central bank would outline a yearly limit on loans that Chinese banks can 
extend to their customers. Each region is then unevenly allocated a loan quota and the sum 
of regional quotas should meet the national limit. Such credit growth has direct implications 
for the availability of financing for firms that wish to expand internationally.  
It is well documented that corporate income taxes have an adverse impact on in-
vestment (see Djankov et al. (2010) for a literature review). The corporate tax rate is set by 
the central government in China. Corporate tax revenue in China has increased from 0.9% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1999 to 3.6% in 2011. In absolute terms, the corporate 
income tax increased 20-fold in 1999–2011, much faster than any other category of taxes. 
Fast rising corporate taxes could have incentivised Chinese firms to invest abroad in search 
of a more favourable tax rate.  
China’s transformation to a market oriented economy has unfortunately also led to 
a proliferation of corruption at all levels. Cole et al. (2009) find that anti-corruption efforts 
attract inward FDI to Chinese regions. Anti-corruption can have a positive impact on fair 
competition and efficient allocation of resources. It also helps to form a better institutional 
environment for where Chinese firms operate in. Therefore, stronger anti-corruption efforts 
would reduce Chinese firms’ incentive to invest abroad.  
Legislation on labour protection and consultation with the trade unions has started 
to be developed in the recent two decades in China (e.g., the 1995 Labour Law, the 2008 
New Labour Contract Law). Consequently, the number of trade unions has been increasing 
across China. Stronger labour protection implies higher production costs for firms. As Zhu 
and Pickles (2011) have pointed out, many Chinese firms choose to relocate abroad where 
labour protection is weaker and the associated costs are lower.  
Many studies have found that Chinese SOEs are inefficient in terms of profits, 
productivity, and growth (e.g., Zhang (2004), Dougherty et al. (2007)). However, SOEs are 
often able to obtain financial resources at low cost from state owned banks and to enjoy 
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preferential government policies. Given the government support, inefficient SOEs make re-
sources less available or only available at a higher cost to other more productive regional 
(e.g. collectively or privately owned) firms that wish to expand abroad15.  
Despite the fact that OFDI is widely encouraged in China, one undesired impact of 
OFDI is that it may cause unemployment at home, as investment abroad may replace home 
country production and exports (Lipsey, 2004). In recent years, in light of high domestic 
unemployment, some countries have adopted policies that restrict OFDI and attract invest-
ments back home16. At the same time, in China, local governments have gained increasing 
power over approving regional OFDI in the past decade17 . Given the recent slowing of ex-
ports and economic growth in China, unemployment would have become a natural concern 
of local governments, making them reluctant to approve regional OFDI. 
R&D capabilities are crucial for firms to expand abroad, as the ability of a firm to 
absorb external technology depends on its own prior R&D efforts (Kafouros & Buckley, 
2008). In China, regional investment in R&D is largely obtained from local government 
budgets, making local governments’ support of R&D an important policy variable that di-
rectly affects how successful local firms’ overseas expansion can be.   
 
Hypothesis 3: The level of China’s regional OFDI is positively related to govern-
ments’ favourable policies towards (a) appreciation of the exchange rate of the 
RMB, (b) high credit growth, (c) high corporate tax rate, (d) rights of workers, (e) 
willingness to approve OFDI, (f) investment on R&D; and is negatively related to 
governments’ favourable policies towards (g) high interest rate, (h) anti-corruption 
effort (i) presence of SOEs.  
 
  
15 Following Duanmu (2012) and Amighini et al (2012), firms with the central or local governments as con-
trolling stake holders are categorised as SOEs. Some of China’s regional OFDI is by regional SOEs controlled 
by the local governments, and hence a greater presence of SOEs may imply more regional OFDI. However, 
such regional SOEs only make up about a third of all SOEs (e.g. 37% in 2011 according to China’s Ministry 
of Finance) whereas most SOEs are inefficient users of resources. Therefore, we believe that the negative 
impact that SOEs have on regional OFDI mentioned above would dominate its positive impact.  
16 UNCTAD (2012) reports that due to the rising home unemployment, in 2011, Argentina required its insur-
ance companies to repatriate all their investments abroad by the end of 2011; India allowed Indian-controlled 
companies abroad to conditionally disinvest without prior approval from the central bank; The US established 
the “Select USA” initiative to encourage US investors abroad to relocate their business operations back home. 
17 For instance, OFDI projects for investing in 135 designated countries by Chinese privately owned enterprises 
only need to get approval by regional Foreign Economic Relation and Trade (FERT) (Luo et al., 2010).   
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3.4 Regional geographic characteristics 
 
Despite the huge geographic heterogeneity among Chinese regions, to our knowledge, no 
geographic factors have been empirically examined as important home determinants of 
China’s OFDI. The Chinese territory consists of coastal areas and interior land. The coastal 
areas cluster in the east and south of China, forming a belt of more developed regions. Porter 
(1990) argues that advantages gained in clusters can form the foundation for successful in-
ternationalisation. These advantages go beyond those due to the co-presence of related firms 
and institutions (e.g. transportation links and climate) (Swann et al., 1998) to further include 
labour market pooling, the emergence of specialised input suppliers, and technological and 
knowledge spillovers (Gupta and Subramanian, 2008). Chinese coastal regions should ben-
efit from being located in a highly clustered environment and hence are more likely to be 
home to successful international expansion compared with inland regions. 
From a home country perspective, there is also huge heterogeneity in the amount of 
natural resources in each region across China. In resource rich regions, a larger proportion 
of firms should be serving regional resource industry and be less pressured to expand abroad 
than those in regions with little national resource endowment.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of China’s regional OFDI is positively related to (a) geo-
graphic location of being coastal regions, but negatively related to (b) natural re-
source endowment.  
 
 
4 Bayesian averaging of maximum likelihood estimates 
 (BAMLE) panel method 
 
Various models and theories have proposed a fairly large number of variables as determi-
nants of outward and inward FDI. However, these model and theories do not provide enough 
guidance regarding the complete specification of which variables are to be kept in the model, 
and different theories are typically compatible with one another. Thus, even when statistical 
tests are carried out on the relation between dependent and independent variables in each 
single models, it remains unclear which specification to favour. This issue is referred to as 
model uncertainty. 
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Often, as summarised by Tsangarides (2004), researchers have three options when 
facing model uncertainty: (i) arbitrarily select one model as the true model generating the 
data; (ii) present the results based on all plausible models without selecting between the 
different specifications; and (iii) explicitly account for model uncertainty. Option (i) risks 
overconfident inferences, while option (ii) is unsystematic and poses substantial logistical 
challenges18.  
Various methods have been proposed for option (iii) of explicitly accounting for 
model uncertainty for cross-sectional data, such as the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Es-
timates (BACE) (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004), the full Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) ap-
proach (Fernandaz et al., 2001), or the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) (Leamer, 1983; 
Levin & Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). More recently, Moral-Benito (2012) extends 
the cross-sectional BMA method to panel data with country specific fixed effect in order to 
simultaneously address model uncertainty and endogeneity issues. A novel maximum like-
lihood estimator which is able to use the within variation across time and also between var-
iation across countries is employed. Moral-Benito (2012) combines this novel maximum 
likelihood estimator with the BMA techniques to construct weighted average of maximum 
likelihood estimates and label the approach as Bayesian Averaging of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates (BAMLE).  
We adopt the BAMLE method for the following reasons. First, our study considers 
not one but four theoretical explanations of China’s regional OFDI and hence requires the 
issue of model uncertainty to be addressed. However, conventional regression, cointegration 
and Generalised Method of Movements (GMM) type analyses that have been employed in 
previous studies on China (see Table 2), are unable to address this issue, whereas the 
BAMLE method provides a clear solution. Second, compared with other methods that can 
deal with model uncertainly, mentioned above (e.g., BACE, BMA, EBA), the BAMLE op-
erates in a panel environment rather than a cross-sectional one, making it ideal for our panel 
study of China’s regional OFDI. Third, as emphasised by Moral-Benito (2012), the novel 
18 It may also be argued that, in principle, as long as the number of observations is large enough, variables 
which do not belong in the regression will have zero coefficients, and hence one can simply include all of the 
explanatory variables from alternative theories in one regression and employ classical statistics. However, as 
pointed out by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), in many applications, we do not have the luxury of having a large 
enough sample size to allow us to draw conclusion on the important of potential regressors based on an all-
inclusive regression. 
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maximum likelihood estimator of the BAMLE method is consistent and asymptotically nor-
mal regardless of non-normality, and hence the BAMLE approach to unobserved heteroge-
neity is as robust as panel GMM estimators in the presence of time series-homoscedasticity.  
We now discuss briefly the BAMLE method. Using the Bayesian terminology, a 
model is formally defined by a likelihood function and a prior density. Supposing that there 
are 𝐾𝐾 possible explanatory variables, there will be 2𝐾𝐾 possible combinations of regressors, 
or 2𝐾𝐾 models. All models, denoted by 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 2𝐾𝐾, seek to explain 𝑦𝑦, the data. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 is 
the estimated parameters for each model 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗. The logic of Bayesian inference suggests that 
Baye’s rule is used to derive a probability statement about what we do not know (i.e. whether 
a model is correct or not) conditional on what we do know (i.e. the data). This implies that 
the posterior model probability can be used to assess the degree of support for 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗.  
The BAMLE approach of Moral-Benito (2012) extends the BMA methodology 
mentioned above to a panel data framework and employs averaging maximum likelihood 
estimates in a Bayesian spirit. In other words, the posterior probability in the standard BMA 
method can be rewritten as:  
 
𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗�𝑦𝑦�𝐸𝐸�𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦,𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗  �2𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1  (1) 
while the BAMLE approach specifies the posterior probability as: 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗�𝑦𝑦�2𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 𝜃𝜃�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗     (2) 
where 𝜃𝜃�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗  is the maximum likelihood estimate for 𝜃𝜃 in model 𝑗𝑗.  
In a panel data context, for a given model 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗, the estimated econometric model 
consists of the following equation: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇)(𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁) (3) 
and two assumptions: 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 …𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖0, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗~𝑁𝑁�𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗?̅?𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2� 
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where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏 denotes lags of dependent variable. 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  denotes the 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 × 1 vector of explanatory 
variables in model 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗. 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is the time-invariant component of the error term capturing the 
unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. it is the individual specific fixed effect. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the error 
tem. 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 is time dummies in the model which capture unobserved common factors across 
countries and therefore cross-sectional dependence is not ruled out. All variables are as-
sumed to be in deviations from their cross-sectional mean. 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗denotes a set of regressors 
which are time-invariant, such as geographic factors without time variation.  
As for the assumptions, ?̅?𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 is the time-series mean of 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 for individual 𝑖𝑖 (?̅?𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 =(1 𝑇𝑇⁄ )∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 ). The first assumption indicates that the strict assumption of exogeneity of 
the lagged dependent variable is relaxed (i.e. it is allowed that current shocks affect future 
values of the dependent variable as implied by the dynamics of the model). This is the key 
assumption to obtain fixed T, large N consistent estimates of the autoregressive parameter α 
in Equation (3). The second assumption implies that while the 𝑥𝑥’s can be correlated with the 
unobserved fixed effect 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, the 𝑧𝑧’s are independent19.  
Under the above assumptions, Moral-Benito (2012) derives the likelihood function 
and the posterior model probability for a particular model 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) approximation (see Moral-Benito (2012) for details). The posterior inclusion 
probability of a particular variable ℎ is calculated as the sum of the posterior model proba-
bilities for all the models including ℎ (i.e., 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃ℎ ≠ 0|𝑦𝑦) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗�𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃ℎ≠0 ).  
 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
Our sample period is 2003–2011. We use annual data for 30 Chinese regions (see Figure 1). 
Tibet is excluded due to data limitations. Variable measurement and data sources are dis-
cussed in Appendix A. Note that our study is at regional level, hence we employ regional 
data when measuring the central government policies (i.e. we look at regional implications 
of these central policies).  
19 This is due to the fact that, while ηi captures the transitional unobserved heterogeneity between countries, zi 
variables capture a second type of fixed but observable heterogeneity. These two types of heterogeneity must 
be uncorrelated. For instance, observable geographic factors (such as land area) are assumed independent from 
unobservable variables such as the ability of its population. 
 20 
                                                 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/ 2015 
 
 
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table 3. Note that 
geographic variables are time invariant dummies and hence are not included. All correlation 
coefficients are below 0.8. Table 3 suggests that there is generally no cause for concern about 
correlations amongst determinants.   
 
 
5.1 Single models 
 
Prior to employing the BAMLE method to explicitly address the model uncertainty issue, as 
a comparison, we first present in Table 4 some single model estimates using the classical 
panel regressions for (1) the extended IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, and (3) 
government incentives. Note that since the geographic variables do not vary over time, they 
are not included in our experimentations at this stage. As shown in Table 2, regression anal-
ysis is the most commonly adopted method in the existing literature on OFDI for China. 
Hence we also employ panel regression analysis for the above three models. However, in 
the case of (1) the extended IDP theory, the agglomeration effects is captured by lagged 
regional OFDI. The presence of a lagged dependent variable would yield seriously biased 
estimates. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) would bias the coefficient of the lagged term 
upwards whereas using fixed effects would cause a downward bias in the aforementioned. 
In addition, the estimates would also be biased because the unobserved country specific ef-
fects may be correlated with the regressors. Thus, to overcome the above mentioned prob-
lems, for the estimation of model (1) the extended IDP theory, we additionally employ the 
system GMM (two-step) estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1988) and present the results as (1b) alongside the panel regression results (1a) 
in Table 4.  
Looking at Table 4, for (1) the extended IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, 
and (3) government incentives, the corresponding significant determinants of China’s re-
gional OFDI are (1) agglomeration effects, human capital, and technology capability, (2) 
cost of labour, pollution, infrastructure, and (3) willingness to approve OFDI, respectively. 
Note that in the case of (1) the extended IDP theory, we prefer the results based on the system 
GMM method (Equations (1b)) over that based on the panel regression method (Equation 
(1a))20.  
20 The Hansen test and serial correlation tests of the GMM results are reported at the bottom of Table 4. The 
Hansen test suggests that the null hypothesis of over identification of the instruments is rejected. The serial 
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Results in Table 4 suggest that all three alternative theories, i.e., (1) the extended 
IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, and (3) government incentives, have explana-
tory power for the phenomenon of China’s regional OFDI. Should we choose one of the 
models, or should we conclude that all determinants from all the models are robust? Since 
the theories or models do not provide guidance to choose between them and they are often 
compatible, the typical issue of module uncertainty arises here. If we choose one of the mod-
els, it would be an arbitrary choice, ignoring factors from alternative models that may have 
similar or stronger explanatory power. On the other hand, if we include all significant factors, 
it is unsystematic and more importantly, it imposes a risky assumption that the same factors 
would remain robust when competing models are also considered in an all-inclusive equa-
tion. Given that China’s regional OFDI is a multi-faceted issue, it is essential to investigate 
alternative theoretical explanations to better understand the drivers behind it. Then the most 
feasible option is to explicitly address the issue of model uncertainty. Therefore, next, we 
move on to the prime empirical exercise of our paper, applying the BAMLE method to our 
data. 
 
 
5.2 BAMLE results 
 
Recall Equation (3) above: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇)(𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁)    (3) 
 
To be more specific, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the dependent variable, is the regional OFDI to Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) ratio. Vector 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  includes the extended IDP theory variables, home locational 
constraints and government incentives, and vector 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 includes the time-invariant geographic 
factors. Note that the lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1, i.e. OFDI/GRP(–1), measures one of 
the extended IDP theory factors, namely the agglomeration effect. Moreover, since the 
BAMLE can accommodate variables without time variation 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖, we are able to include the 
correlation tests suggest that there are first-order serial correlations, which is often expected, but no evidence 
of second-order serial correlation in the differenced error terms. We also report the difference in the Hansen 
test to check the exogeneity of each sub-set of instruments, which again does not reject the null of the joint 
validity of all the instruments. 
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two geographic factors (location and natural resources endowment) as determinates of 
China’s regional OFDI.  
To implement the BAMLE method, only the prior mean model size, 𝑚𝑚, needs to be 
specified. It determines the prior inclusion probability (𝜉𝜉) via the following equation: 
 
𝜉𝜉 = 𝑚𝑚/𝐾𝐾            (4) 
 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) suggest setting 𝑚𝑚 = 7 to use the Bayesian Averaging of Classical 
Estimates method for cross-sectional data. Moral-Benito (2012) proposes setting 𝑚𝑚 = 5 in-
stead under the panel framework of the BAMLE method. In our study, we experiment with 
both prior mean model sizes, i.e. 𝑚𝑚 = 5 and 𝑚𝑚 = 7, to evaluate whether our results are 
sensitive to the choice of 𝑚𝑚. It is important to point out that the Bayesian robustness check 
adopted in the BAMLE approach is the posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs) (ℎ) being 
higher than the prior inclusion probabilities (𝜉𝜉), i.e., ℎ > 𝜉𝜉. Based on Equation (4), 𝜉𝜉 in our 
study is 0.217 when 𝑚𝑚 = 5 and 0.304 when 𝑚𝑚 = 7 (𝐾𝐾 = 23).  
The BAMLE test results are presented in Table 5. Comparing the two sets of results 
(𝑚𝑚 = 5 and 𝑚𝑚 = 7), all variables have the same signs. More importantly, based on the 
Bayesian robustness check used in the BAMLE approach (i.e., ℎ > 𝜉𝜉), the same variables 
are robust irrespective of the choice of 𝑚𝑚. This confirms that our results are not sensitive to 
the choice of 𝑚𝑚. Specifically, robust home determinants of China’s regional OFDI include 
three government policy variables (presence of SOEs, willingness to approve OFDI and in-
vestment in R&D), two extended IDP theory variables (trade openness and agglomeration 
effect21) and one home locational constraint (pollution)22.  
21 In BAMLE method, the lagged dependent variable (in our case the agglomerate effect) is incorporated in all 
models, i.e., its posterior inclusion probability is one. We adopt this setting given the overwhelming evidence 
for the agglomeration effect for OFDI from China (e.g., Cheung & Qian, 2009) and from other countries (see 
Faeth (2009) for a review). The posterior mean for the agglomerate effect has the expected positive sign. The 
posterior standard deviation is much smaller than the mean (the latter divided by the former is 4.148 when m=5 
and 4.087 when m=7). These confirm that it is a robust determinant.   
22 When interpreting the PIPs in Table 5, an alternative rule of thumb proposed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined 
by Kass & Raftery (1995) to judge the effectiveness of a regressor in explaining OFDI is that, the effect of a 
regressor is weak, positive, strong, or decisive if the PIPs lie between 50-75%, 75%-95%, 95%-99% or are 
greater than 99%, respectively. We thus set the prior inclusion probability to random and re-run the BAMLE 
tests using one million loops. Robust variables based on this alternative rule include two government policy 
variables (presence of SOEs (positive), willingness to approve OFDI (decisive)) and two extended IDP theory 
variables (trade openness (positive), agglomeration effect (decisive)). In our study, we follow the Bayesian 
robust check rule of the BAMLE method in Moral-Benito (2012), i.e., the PIPs (h) being higher than the prior 
inclusion probabilities (ξ) (h > ξ), especially since the alternative rule does not generate results that are very 
different from the general conclusions of our paper.  
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A comparison between Table 5 and Table 4 highlights the following issues. First, 
results in Table 4 suggest a total of seven significant home determinants of China’s regional 
OFDI based on the three alternative models, while the BAMLE method suggests one fewer, 
i.e., a total of six variables. Second and more importantly, while the GMM and regression 
methods suggest three significant variables each for the extended IDP and home locational 
constraint models and only one for the government incentives model, the BAMLE results in 
Table 5 highlight the importance of government incentives (three robust variables) in ex-
plaining China’s regional OFDI compared with the former two models (two and one signif-
icant variables respectively). In addition, overall, the robust variables in Table 5 are rather 
different from those suggested by Table 4. The above comparison first confirms that, given 
that significant variables are found in all models, irrespective of whether the model uncer-
tainty issue is addressed (in Table 5) or not (in Table 4), it is indeed necessary to employ 
alternative models to explain the multi-faceted issue of China’s regional OFDI. Another in-
teresting finding is that the single model estimates indicate different and more significant 
variables compared with the BAMLE results, where alternative models are considered sim-
ultaneously and model uncertainty issue is addressed. More specifically, employing the sin-
gle model estimates would exaggerate the importance of the extended IDP and home loca-
tional constraints theories and underestimate the significance of government policy factors. 
Thus, the comparison shows that the impact of model uncertainty on China’s regional OFDI 
estimates is substantial and that employing the BAMLE method is necessary.       
We now explain in detail our results in Table 5. Looking at Table 5, we first notice 
that GRP per capita does not appear to be a robust determinant of China’s regional OFDI. 
This is in contrast to the prediction of the original IDP hypothesis, which is widely observed 
in previous studies. It is also in contrast to Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon (2010), who 
extend the original IDP theory to China incorporating additional economic variables. There 
could be two explanations. First, previous studies, such as Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon 
(2010), did not distinguish between central and regional OFDI from China. Hence their con-
clusions may be biased towards central OFDI given its dominant share. Second, although 
we also employ an extended IDP theory, we compete it with other alternative theories, in-
cluding the government incentives theory. That GRP per capita is of little importance sug-
gests that other characteristics of the Chinese economy (e.g. government policies) may have 
much more important effects on China’s regional OFDI. As suggested by Durán & Ubeda 
(2001), OFDI from developing countries may depend less on economic development and 
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more on the activity carried out by governments. Our results suggest this is the case for 
China’s regional OFDI23.  
We now investigate our prime interest, the government policy variables. All three 
robust policy variables have the expected signs, confirming our predictions set out in Section 
3. It is interesting to notice that both regional government policies, namely willingness to 
approve OFDI and investment in R&D, are robust. In contrast, only one central government 
policy, namely presence of SOEs, turns out to be a robust determinant. Our results suggest 
that both central and local governments have a strong influence on China’s regional OFDI. 
More importantly, our results especially highlight the irreplaceable role of local govern-
ments.  
On the other hand, six other policy variables, all of which are set by the central 
government, turn out to have little influence on China’s regional OFDI. It is interesting to 
observe that monetary policy, measured by the real base annual lending rate and credit 
growth set by the Chinese central bank, does not affect regional firms’ decisions on whether 
to invest abroad. In China's bank-based financial system, in parallel with formal banking 
institutions, there is a flourishing informal financial market. The increasing demand for 
credit among China's private enterprises seems to be neglected by the former and hence the 
latter contributes to closing the gap (Tanaka & Molnar, 2008). A thriving informal banking 
sector has notably weakened the link between monetary policy and the cost and availability 
of regional firms’ financing.  
In terms of home locational constraints, we find that pollution is a robust determi-
nant of China OFDI, but with a positive sign. As pointed out by Chow (2008), although the 
central government recognises the use of penalties, specific laws are yet to be passed in areas 
such as listing detailed polluting activities, estimating the negative externalities, and speci-
fying suitable penalties for violations. Another major hindrance to environmental law en-
forcement is the lack of cooperation from regional governments, which are more interested 
in increasing regional output than in controlling pollution. Both imply that local firms could 
be paying much lower penalties than the environmental damage they cause. Assuming that 
environmental costs must reach a threshold level before they trigger an outflow of FDI (Man-
derson & Kneller, 2012), before the threshold is reached, firms may be inclined to stay in 
China rather than to expand abroad.  We find domestic consumption and labour cost are not 
23 Note that even when we employ single model estimates for the extended IDP theory for China’s OFDI at 
regional level (Equations (1a) and (1b) in Table 4), GRP per capita turns out to be an insignificant determinant.  
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robust determinants. This implies that Chinese firms are not taking investment abroad as an 
exit strategy based on insufficient domestic demand. Despite rapidly increasing labour costs, 
the relative cost of labour may still be low enough to attract firms to stay in China. Our 
results also indicate that Chinese regional investors do not invest abroad in order to escape 
foreign competition or poor infrastructure in China.  
Turning to the extended IDP theory, only two economic variables, namely trade 
openness and the agglomeration effect, are found to be robust. It seems that the other four 
factors have little influence on OFDI at regional level. For instance, while inward FDI con-
centrates on manufacturing industry in China, regional OFDI flows to other industries. Also, 
despite greater availability of FX reserves at local level, financial institutions that channel 
reserves to international firms may remain underdeveloped. Technological capability and 
human capital stock not being robust may suggest that regional overseas investors do not 
tend to invest in high technology sectors. Note that GRP per capital not being a robust de-
terminant has been discussed above.   
Both geographic factors have high PIPs, but their posterior standard deviations are 
higher than the posterior means. It implies these two variables are associated with OFDI, but 
we are not able to confirm in which direction. The same conclusion is reached when  𝑚𝑚 = 5 
and 𝑚𝑚 = 7. We originally expect geographic location to be an important determinant. How-
ever, our empirical results suggest otherwise. Given the shifting of OFDI sources from east-
ern to inner and western regions, such results may reflect an overall more balanced distribu-
tion of OFDI across the regions of China in recent decade.  
To sum up, the BAMLE results first confirm the explanatory power of all the pro-
posed theories (except the geographic factors) in our study. The importance of government 
policy variables, namely presence of SOEs, willingness to approve local OFDI and invest-
ment in R&D, are particularly highlighted. The fact that two of the three polices variables 
are at local level shows that local governments significantly influence regional OFDI. Our 
study does not support the original IDP theory. In other words, China’s OFDI, at least at 
regional level, is not the result of economic development as measured solely by GRP per 
capita. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of prior mean model size. 
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6 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Our study investigates the home determinants of China’s regional OFDI. We provide a first 
analysis that focuses on China’s OFDI at regional level, using a theoretical framework that 
integrates four different but complementary explanations: the extended IDP theory, home 
locational constraints, government incentives and geographic factors. Many variables exam-
ined in our study have never been introduced previously to analyse China’s OFDI. At the 
empirical level, we employ the BAMLE method to deal with the issue of model uncertainty. 
This is the first time this method has been used in the FDI literature. A comparison between 
the BAMLE method and traditional panel regression and GMM methods confirms the ne-
cessity of employing the former.  
Overall, our results first confirm the importance of the extended IDP theory, home 
locational constraints and government policies in determining China’s regional OFDI. At 
the same time, it also shows that none of these aspects alone has full explanatory power. 
Thus, our results demonstrate the necessity of employing a framework that combines several 
theories to better understand the drivers of China’s regional OFDI. Second, our findings 
highlight the importance of government policy variables, namely the presence of SOEs, will-
ingness to approve local OFDI, and investment in R&D. More importantly, we find local 
government policies (such as the latter two policies above) have notable influence on re-
gional OFDI. This suggests that the rising importance of the local governments should not 
be overlooked, especially on issues of regional dimension. Third, although previous studies 
may suggest that OFDI will be automatically promoted by economic development in transi-
tional or developing economies (e.g. Liu et al. (2005)), our study clearly indicates that, at 
least at regional level, China’s overseas investment is not due solely to economic as devel-
opment measured by GRP per capita. Rather, our study emphasises the vital role of govern-
ment policies, both at regional and central levels, in determining China’s regional OFDI. 
Fourth, robust variables based on the extended IDP theory include trade openness and ag-
glomeration effect, but pollution is the only home locational constraint that is robust. Fifth, 
geographic factors have little impact on regional OFDI. Our results are not sensitive to the 
choice of prior mean model size.  
Our study provides important implications for policy makers at both the central and 
local levels. OFDI promoting policies have largely been designed at the central level. Central 
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policy makers need to recognise the heterogeneity of regional economies and that local in-
vestment may respond to a different set of factors compared with central investment abroad. 
It is important to take these differences into account when setting OFDI policies, especially 
given that about a quarter of China’s OFDI originates at local level. For instance, while 
granting lower interest rates on loans to facilitate OFDI may boost overseas investment from 
centrally-owned enterprises, it may have little impact on investment decisions of local firms 
as their financing mainly depends on informal financial markets. In order to effectively en-
courage foreign investment at local level, policy makers need to employ measures that can 
lower the interest rates in the informal financial markets rather than at the large state owned 
banks.  
As for the regional level, our study provides direct reference on the tools that local 
government can employ to support firms’ overseas investment, such as more investment in 
R&D, approving OFDI projects based on their merits rather than local economic growth and 
unemployment rates, and directing a certain amount of resources away from SOEs. In addi-
tion, local authorities can also help encourage foreign trade, price pollution properly, and 
actively penalise polluters. It is equally important that both levels of governments cooperate. 
For example, pollution law implemented by central government may have minimal local 
effect if local authorities are only interested in increasing their output rather than enforcing 
penalties. 
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Figure and tables 
 
 
Figure 1 Map of China 
 
 
Source: The Huntington Archive http://huntingtonarchive.osu.edu/resources/locatorMaps.html#!pretty-
Photo/52/ 
 
Note: There are thirty one regions in China, which include twenty two provinces (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, 
Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, 
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang), five Autonomous Regions (Guangxi , In-
ner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang) and four Municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin). In 
our study we include all these regions except Tibet due to data limitations. 
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Table 1 China’s OFDI at central and regional levels (million USD) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total OFDI 2855 5498 12261 17634 26506 41859 47795 60182 68584 
Central OFDI 2098 4525 10204 15237 21253 35983 38193 42437 45023 
Regional OFDI 757 973 2058 2397 5253 5876 9603 17745 23560 
Regional / 
Total OFDI (%) 26.5 17.7 16.8 13.6 19.8 14.0 20.1 29.5 34.4 
 
 
 
Table 2 Review on recent empirical analysis on determinants of China’s OFDI 
Authors Level Home/Ho
st 
Theoretical Framework Methodology 
Liu et al. 
(2005) 
Country Home Investment Development Path (IDP) theory Cointegration and 
GMM 
Wei & Alon 
(2010) 
Country Home Extended IDP theory Partial least square 
regression) 
Tolentino 
(2010) 
Country Home Home country-specific macroeconomic factors 
of China and India (it is argued that ownership 
advantages reflect national economic  
characteristics) 
Vector Autoregres-
sion (VAR) model  
Buckley et 
al. (2007) 
Country Host Three special explanations (capital market  
imperfections, special ownership advantages 
and institutional factors) are nested within the 
general theory of the multinational firm  
(Market-seeking motive, resources seeking 
motive, strategic asset seeking motive) 
Regression analysis 
(pooled OLS and 
random effect  
Generalised Least 
Squares(GLS)) 
Cheng & Ma 
(2008) 
Country Host A set of macroeconomic variables are 
identified based on literature review and  
data availability 
Regression analysis 
(on a gravity model) 
Cheung & 
Qian (2009) 
Country Host Market-seeking motive,  resources seeking mo-
tive 
Regression analysis 
Kolstad & 
Wigg (2012) 
Country Host Determinants are identified based on conclu-
sions derived from review of literature and the 
characteristics of the Chinese economy 
Regression analysis 
Amighini et 
al. (2011) 
Industry Host  Market-seeking motive, resources seeking  
motive, strategic asset seeking  
Random effect  
probit model 
Wang et al. 
(2012) 
Firm Home A combination of three theoretical frame-
works: resource based view of firms, industrial 
organisation economy, and institutional theory 
(to capture firm, industry, and country level 
variables respectively) 
Regression analysis 
Amighini et 
al. (2012) 
Ownership 
(SOEs and  
private firms) 
Host Market-seeking motive, resources seeking  
motive, strategic asset seeking motive 
Random effect  
panel Poisson model 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
Variables Mean S.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) GRP per capita 9.79 0.62 1                     
(2) human capital 2.36 0.08 0.69 1                    
(3) inward FDI 0.55 1.14 0.50 0.49 1                   
(4) international trade 2.97 1.02 0.69 0.54 0.53 1                  
(5) FX reserves 4.68 0.35 –0.26 –0.39 –0.08 –0.24 1                 
(6) technology capability 0.22 1.19 0.68 0.63 0.51 0.74 –0.23 1                
(7) agglomeration effects 2.31 0.01 0.47 0.30 0.12 0.34 –0.17 0.49 1               
(8) cost of labour 11.01 3.60 –0.10 0.10 0.15 –0.04 –0.09 –0.16 –0.17 1              
(9) foreign competition 3.10 0.93 0.51 0.45 0.77 0.58 –0.08 0.54 0.14 0.09 1             
(10) pollution –2.30 0.29 –0.08 –0.08 –0.23 –0.07 –0.11 0.00 –0.11 0.03 –0.22 1            
(11) domestic consumption 3.56 0.18 –0.65 –0.44 –0.24 –0.36 0.09 –0.41 –0.10 –0.04 –0.23 –0.13 1           
(12) infrastructure 3.12 0.62 –0.20 –0.37 –0.50 –0.55 0.18 –0.33 –0.11 –0.07 –0.62 –0.05 –0.07 1          
(13) RMB exchange rate  4.72 0.12 0.44 0.20 –0.11 –0.12 –0.03 0.37 0.40 –0.30 –0.08 –0.22 –0.24 0.45 1         
(14) credit growth 3.18 0.38 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.17 –0.19 0.34 0.28 –0.09 0.08 –0.06 –0.07 0.01 0.31 1        
(15) corporate tax rate  –0.42 0.62 0.68 0.47 0.33 0.57 –0.34 0.69 0.41 –0.02 0.38 –0.14 –0.23 –0.24 0.27 0.49 1       
(16) rights of the workers 2.40 0.42 0.79 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.03 0.68 0.38 –0.17 0.40 –0.22 –0.48 0.06 0.59 0.28 0.53 1      
(17) willingness to approve OFDI 1.31 0.21 –0.37 –0.40 –0.11 –0.42 0.60 –0.37 –0.30 0.03 –0.18 –0.03 0.27 0.13 –0.13 –0.25 –0.43 –0.13 1     
(18) investment on R&D 5.17 0.87 0.62 0.37 0.29 0.32 –0.06 0.68 0.40 –0.16 0.37 –0.01 –0.25 –0.08 0.55 0.12 0.47 0.49 –0.27 1    
(19) interest rate 2.79 2.08 –0.00 0.04 0.14 0.12 –0.01 0.04 –0.09 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.04 –0.21 –0.38 0.25 0.24 –0.12 –0.03 –0.10 1   
(20) anti–corruption effort  3.39 0.35 0.11 0.18 0.01 –0.11 0.12 –0.01 0.00 0.06 –0.08 0.01 –0.28 0.15 0.15 0.01 –0.03 0.16 0.06 –0.05 –0.03 1  
(21) presence of SOEs 3.80 0.39 –0.07 0.03 –0.40 –0.21 –0.09 –0.16 0.00 0.08 –0.39 0.46 –0.03 0.21 0.07 –0.09 –0.05 –0.09 0.18 –0.19 –0.07 0.21 1 
 
Note: geographic variables are not included in this table as they are dummy variables (see Appendix A)   
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Table 4 Single model results  
Dependent variable: China’s regional OFDI to GRP ratio 
(1) The extended IDP theory (2) Home locational con-straints 
(3) Government incenti-
ves 
(1a) Panel regression  
(fixed effect)  (1b) GMM 
(2) Panel regression  
(fixed effect) 
(3) Panel regression  
(fixed effect) 
GRP per ca-
pita 
0.0215 
(0.0147) 
GRP per ca-
pita 
–0.0435 
(0.0381) 
Cost of  
labour 
–0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
RMB ex-
change rate 
0.0165 
(0.0315) 
Human  
capital  
–0.1296 
(0.1069) 
 
Human  
capital  
–0.2765* 
(0.1450) 
Foreign com-
petition 
–0.0013 
(0.0045) 
Credit 
growth 
–0.0023 
(0.0035) 
Inward FDI –0.0023 
(0.0028) 
 
Inward FDI –0.0029 
(0.0106) 
Pollution –0.0243* 
(0.0139) 
Corporate 
tax rate 
0.0076 
(0.0053) 
International 
trade 
0.0180 
(0.0142) 
 
International 
trade 
0.0313 
(0.0226) 
Domestic 
consumption 
–0.0201 
(0.0252) 
Right of the 
workers 
–0.0126 
(0.0115) 
FX reserves –0.0094* 
(0.0050) 
FX reserves 0.0221 
(0.0329) 
Infrastructure 0.0074** 
(0.0032) 
Willingness 
to approve 
OFDI 
–0.1113* 
(0.0564) 
Technology 
capability 
0.0035 
(0.0045) 
 
Technology 
capability 
0.0405* 
(0.0236) 
Constant 2.3179*** 
(0.1079) 
Investment 
on R&D 
0.0083 
(0.0075) 
Agglomera-
tion effects 
0.6086 
(0.4328) 
Agglomera-
tion effects 
1.3647*** 
(0.2083) 
 
  Interest rate –0.0006 
(0.0008) 
Constant 0.9949 
(0.9037) 
    Anti-corrup-
tion effort 
–0.0011 
(0.0051) 
      Presence of 
SOEs 
–0.0303 
(0.02559) 
 
      Constant 2.5011 
(0.2622) 
        
No. of  
observations 
240 No. of  
observations 
240 No. of  
observations 
240 No. of  
observations 
240 
No. of 
groups 
30 No. of 
groups 
30 No. of groups 30 No. of 
groups 
30 
ρ 0.6642 AR1 
(p-value) 
0.016 ρ 0.2780 ρ 0.7776 
R2 0.4732 AR2 
(p-value) 
0.916 R2 0.2814 R2 0.5714 
Adjusted R2 0.3798 Hansen  
(p-value) 
0.763 Adjusted R2 0.1774 Adjusted R2 0.5009 
F-value 33.43*** 
Difference 
in Hansen 
test 
(p-value) 
0.937 F-value 6.95*** F-value 6.30*** 
 
Note: Panel regression is employed for estimations (1a), (2) and (3). In all three cases fixed effect model is 
chosen over random effect model based on Hausman test results. System-GMM (two step) is employed for 
the estimation (1b). The t-stats are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. AR1 and AR2 are tests for 1st order serial 2nd order serial correlation, respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A 
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Table 5 BAMLE approach results  
Variables 
m=5   m=7 
Posterior Inclusion 
Probability (PIPs) (ℎ) Posterior Mean 
Posterior Standard 
Deviation  
Posterior Inclusion 
Probability (PIPs) (ℎ) Posterior Mean 
Posterior Standard 
Deviation 
Extended IDP theory        
(1) GRP per capita 0.022 –0.001 0.002  0.037 –0.001 0.002 
(2) human capital 0.044 –0.061 0.061  0.063 –0.060 0.062 
(3) inward FDI 0.025 0.000 0.002  0.036 
 
0.000 0.003 
(4) international trade 0.735 0.017 0.006  0.855 0.018 0.006 
(5) FX reserves 0.095 –0.006 0.006  0.130 –0.006 0.006 
(6) technology capability 0.053 0.002 0.005  0.071 0.003 0.005 
(7) agglomeration effects 1.000 0.477 0.115  1.000 0.470 0.115 
        
Home locational constraints        
(8) cost of labour 0.024 0.000 0.000  0.038 0.000 0.000 
(9) foreign competition 0.031 0.001 0.006  0.053 0.000 0.007 
(10) pollution 0.352 –0.019 0.012  0.454 –0.020 0.012 
(11) domestic consumption 0.050 0.007 0.014  0.069 0.007 0.014 
(12) infrastructure 0.051 –0.008 0.007  0.074 –0.008 0.007 
        
Government incentives        
(13) RMB exchange rate  0.055 0.109 0.082  0.098 0.123 0.083 
(14) credit growth 0.025 0.002 0.006  0.042 0.001 0.006 
(15) corporate tax rate  0.186 0.014 0.007  0.199 0.013 0.007 
(16) rights of the workers 0.118 –0.021 0.012  0.197 –0.023 0.013 
(17) willingness to approve OFDI 1.000 –0.100 0.016  1.000 –0.098 0.016 
(18) investment on R&D 0.309 0.030 0.016  0.401 0.030 0.016 
(19) interest rate 0.052 –0.002 0.001  0.080 –0.002 0.001 
(20) anti-corruption effort  0.044 –0.004 0.004  0.065 –0.004 0.004 
(21) presence of SOEs 0.781 –0.044 0.013  0.866 –0.044 0.013 
        
Geographic factors        
(22) Geographic location 0.478 0.002 0.004  0.432 0.001 0.004 
(23) Natural resources endowment 0.535 –0.003 0.003  0.587 –0.003 0.003 
 
Note: GAUSS algorithm for the BAMLE method is provided by Dr. Moral-Benito. There are as many as 2𝐾𝐾 models given 𝐾𝐾 explanatory variables. Moreal-Benito (2012) 
employs Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀3) algorithm to reduce the number of model under consideration. The number of iterations of the algorithm is 
set at one million.  Following Moral-Benito (2012), the Bayesian robustness check adopted in the BAMLE approach is the PIPs (ℎ) being higher than the prior inclusion 
probabilities (𝜉𝜉), i.e., ℎ > 𝜉𝜉. Based on Equation (4), 𝜉𝜉 in our study is 0.217 when 𝑚𝑚 = 5 and 0.304 when 𝑚𝑚 = 7 (𝐾𝐾 = 23).  
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Appendix A. Regional variable measurement and data source 
 
Variables Measurement Data source 
outward FDI outward FDI divided by gross regional product (GRP) SBCOFDI, 
 (1) GRP per capita Real GRP per capita (nominal GRP adjusted by consumer price index (CPI)) divided by regional population) CSY  
(2) human capital average schooling years of working population (see Wang and Yao (2003) for a similar measurement) CSY 
(3) inward FDI inward FDI divided by GRP CCSY, CSY 
(4) international trade sum of export and import divided by GRP CCSY, CSY 
(5) FX reserves export minus import divided by GRP CCSY, CSY 
(6) technology capability patent applications divided by population CSY 
(7) agglomeration effects outward FDI of the previous year SBCOFDI, 
 (8) cost of labour growth rate of real average salary (nominal salary adjusted by CPI) per person.  CSY 
(9) foreign competition exports from foreign invested enterprises divided by total exports CSY 
(10) pollution the amount of CO2 emission (standard cubic meter) divided by population CSY 
(11) domestic consumption household consumption divided by GRP CSY 
(12) infrastructure number of landlines per person CSY 
(13) RMB exchange rate  real CNY/USD exchange rate (nominal rate adjusted by relative CPI of the US to each Chinese region) IFS, CSY 
(14) credit growth loan growth divided by GRP ACFB, CSY 
(15) corporate tax rate  corporate tax divided by GRP CCSY, CSY 
(16) rights of the workers number of trade unions divided by population CLSY, CSY 
(17) willingness to approve OFDI unemployment rate CSY 
(18) investment on R&D ratio of regional governments’ investment on science and research to total governments’ expenditure CSY 
(19) interest rate annual national base interest rate set by the central bank adjusted by regional CPI to obtain the real regional rates PBC, CSY 
(20) anti-corruption effort  number of registered cases under the direct investigation of the people’s procuratorates divided by population PYC, CSY 
(21) presence of SOEs SOEs’ output to GRP (SOEs defined following Duanmu (2012) and Amighini et al. (2012)) CSY 
(22) Geographic location one for coastal (non-landlocked) regions (Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan) and zero for interior regions Figure 1 
(23) Natural resources endowment one for natural resources rich regions (regions with stock in coal higher than regional average) (Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi and Xinjiang) and zero for other regions CSY 
 
Note: SBCOFDI: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment; CSY: China Statistical Yearbook; IFS: International Financial Statistics; CCSY: China 
City Statistical Yearbook; ACFB: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking; PYC: Procuratorial Yearbook of China; CLSY: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, PBC: 
People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/). Sample period is 2003-2011. All price indices have 2005 as the base year (2005=100). All data are at regional level (note 
that the annual base interest rate set by the central bank and the nominal exchange of CNY/USD are national level data before they were adjusted by regional CPI to obtain the 
regional real terms). All variables are in natural logarithm except the cost of labour and interest rate.  
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